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Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
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Abstract 
On March 23, 2009, the U.S. Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), announced the Public-Private Investment 
Program (PPIP). PPIP consisted of two complementary programs designed to foster liquidity 
in the market for certain mortgage-related assets: The Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy 
Securities Program. This case study discusses the design and implementation of the Legacy 
Loans Program. Under this program, the FDIC and Treasury attempted to create public-
private investment partnerships that—using a combination of private equity, Treasury 
equity, and FDIC-guaranteed debt—would purchase legacy mortgage loans from U.S. banks 
by way of FDIC-supervised auctions of them. Despite months of FDIC attempts to develop the 
program, it was never implemented. The program was criticized by many in the media and 
academic community for favoring the interests of private investors over those of taxpayers; 
government officials, however, have contended that these concerns were unfounded. 
Keywords: Public-Private Investment Program, PPIP, Legacy Loans Program, TARP, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, FDIC, mortgage-related assets, asset purchase program  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance  
By the fall of 2008, troubled mortgage-related 
assets had become inextricably linked to the onset 
of the Global Financial Crisis. Marked down to only 
a fraction of what they were once worth, these 
assets weighed heavily on financial institutions in 
possession of them, consuming their capital, raising 
concerns about their solvency, and inhibiting their 
ability to make new loans.  
On March 23, 2009, the U.S. Treasury, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the 
Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced the Public-
Private Investment Program (PPIP), consisting of 
two complementary programs designed to create 
demand and provide liquidity for these assets: the 
Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy Securities 
Program. This case study discusses the design and 
implementation of the Legacy Loans Program. For 
more information on the Legacy Securities Program, 
see Henken 2019. 
The Legacy Loans Program revolved around the 
creation of public-private investment funds (PPIFs) 
that—using a combination of private equity, 
Treasury equity, and FDIC-guaranteed debt—would purchase legacy mortgage loans from U.S. banks by way of 
FDIC-supervised auctions of them. As the primary government sponsor, the FDIC was responsible for most of 
the program’s elements, including establishing PPIFs with private investors, setting guidelines for 
participation, reviewing loans submitted by banks, and ultimately putting up the loans for auction.  
Immediately following its announcement, the program was received favorably by investors. However, doubt 
about its viability soon grew. Despite spending months developing the program, the FDIC and the Treasury 
never implemented it.  
Summary Evaluation 
The Legacy Loans Program was met with criticism from many in the media and the academic community. Some 
argued that the program was doomed to fail from the very beginning—that it offered plenty of incentives for 
private investors but little reason for holders of mortgage loans to now sell them, resulting in a stalemate and 
little new market activity. Others worried that the program created a moral hazard, presenting private 




Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To facilitate private investment in illiquid 
mortgage loans through a public-private partnership 
and FDIC-supervised auctions of them. 
Announcement Date   March 23, 2009 
Operational Date Never implemented 
Legal Authority Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 
(Troubled Asset Relief 
Program); FDIC systemic 
risk exception 
Program Mechanics To form public-private 
investment funds to 
purchase mortgage loans put 
up for sale by banks via an 
FDIC-led auction 
Peak Usage $0 (as originally planned) 
Government 
Sponsors 
U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Board, Federal 
Reserve Board 
Legacy Loans Program (PPIP) 
308





The Legacy Loans Program:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 




















Size of banking 
system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
 




of banking system 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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ownership of banking 
system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 
for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 
for 2008 
 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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I.  Overview 
Background 
By the fall of 2008, troubled mortgage-related assets had become inextricably linked to the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Marked down to only a fraction of what they once 
were worth, these assets weighed heavily on the nation’s financial institutions, consuming 
their capital, raising concerns about their solvency, and inhibiting their ability to make new 
loans (PPIP White Paper 2009). 
On September 19, 2008, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson issued a public statement on 
the escalating crisis, calling troubled mortgage-related assets “the underlying weakness [of 
the U.S.] financial system” (Paulson Statement 9/19/2018). Two weeks later, Congress 
responded by enacting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), approving the 
creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and giving the Treasury up to $700 
billion with which to purchase these assets. 
By the end of year, the Treasury had disbursed nearly $200 billion in TARP funding; however, 
it had yet to establish an asset purchase program. Two months earlier, the Treasury decided 
to halt the development of such a program, citing the exceeding complexity of designing one 
and the relative inefficiency of buying troubled assets as opposed to bank capital (Paulson 
Statement 11/12/2008). 
By early 2009, the worst of the financial crisis had subsided, yet troubled mortgage assets 
continued to pose a threat to the broader financial system. Deep markdowns on these assets 
“[created] uncertainty around the balance sheets of financial institutions [holding them], 
compromising their ability to raise capital and their willingness to increase lending” (PPIP 
Fact Sheet 2009). The resulting drag on new credit formation threatened to exacerbate the 
ongoing recession (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009). 
On February 10, 2009, in recognition of the risk of prolonged financial and economic 
instability, the Obama Treasury announced a comprehensive Financial Stability Plan that 
was intended to “attack [the] credit crisis on all fronts” (Financial Stability Plan 2009). Given 
the prevalence of troubled mortgage assets and their role in instigating the crisis, a key focus 
of this plan was to “restart” primary and secondary markets for these assets, with the hope 
of giving financial institutions a chance to “cleanse their balance sheets” of them (Financial 
Stability Plan 2009). 
Program Description 
On March 23, 2009, on the basis of a proposal outlined in the Financial Stability Plan, the 
Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve (Fed) 
officially announced the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). The program was 
created to allow for the establishment of public-private investment partnerships; “using $75 
[billion] to $100 billion in TARP capital and capital from private investors,” these 
partnerships would aim to purchase up to $500 billion in “legacy assets,” providing a 
significant injection of liquidity to the market for them (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009). PPIP 
consisted of two complementary programs designed to support the market for mortgage 
loans and related assets: the Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy Securities Program. This 
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case study discusses the design and implementation of the Legacy Loans Program. For more 
information on the Legacy Securities Program, see Henken 2019.3  
The Legacy Loans Program revolved around the creation of public-private investment funds 
(PPIFs) that—using a combination of private equity, Treasury equity, and FDIC-guaranteed 
debt—would purchase legacy mortgage loans from U.S. banks by way of FDIC-supervised 
auctions of them. In so doing, the government sought “to boost private demand for [these] 
distressed assets . . . and facilitate market-priced sales of [them],” helping banks “to free up 
capital” and to pick up the pace of “new credit formation” (PPIP White Paper 2009). 
Program Sequence 
To begin the program, eligible U.S. banks and savings associations were instructed “to work 
with their primary regulators to identify” pools of legacy mortgage loans that they wanted 
to sell. Once they did so, the FDIC—with the help of a “third party valuation firm”—would 
assess the quality of the loans and, based on this assessment, decide how much leverage 
investors could take on when purchasing them. In all cases, leverage would not be more than 
6:1. After rendering a judgment, the FDIC would put up the loans for auction and collect bids 
submitted by the PPIFs. At the conclusion of each auction, the FDIC would inform the seller 
of the top bid and allow it time to decide whether to accept (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009; PPIP 
White Paper 2009; SIGTARP Report Q2 2009). 
If their bids were accepted, PPIFs would finance purchases of loans by committing a 
combination of Treasury and private equity and by issuing nonrecourse, FDIC-guaranteed 
debt. The proportion of equity and debt used to finance purchases depended on the leverage 
the FDIC had permitted for the loans. Say, for example, that a loan pool with a face value of 
$100 was sold to a PPIF for $84 and that the FDIC had permitted leverage of 6:1 for its 
purchase. To fund the purchase of these loans, a PPIF would commit $6 of private equity and 
$6 of Treasury equity and issue $72 of FDIC-guaranteed debt (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009). Figure 
1 illustrates an example of such a scenario. 
Figure 1: Example Sale of $100 Loan Portfolio 
Source: Based on Figure 2.20, SIGTARP Report Q2 2009. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 Henken, Benjamin. 2019. “The Public-Private Investment Program: The Legacy Securities Program (U.S. GFC).” 
Yale Program on Financial Stability. 
Example sale of 
$100 loan 
portfolio for $84 
to a buyer using 
leverage of 6:1 
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As noted above, equity in each PPIF would be divided equally between the Treasury and 
private investors, and all investments would consist of Treasury and private equity in equal 
parts. The FDIC anticipated participation by a wide range of private investors, such as 
“financial institutions, individuals, insurance companies, mutual funds, publicly managed 
investment funds and pension funds.” In return for its commitment, the Treasury would 
receive warrants in each PPIF (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
After committing equity, PPIFs fulfilled what remained of a purchase price by issuing debt 
directly to the banks from which they purchased the loans.4 The FDIC would provide a 
guarantee for this debt, for which it would receive a fee to be paid annually and based on the 
amount that remained outstanding. The guarantee would be secured by the loans that the 
debt was used to purchase (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
Profit- and Loss-Sharing 
All returns generated by PPIFs would be divided by their stakeholders in proportion to their 
equity interests (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
Assets Management 
Assets acquired by PPIFs would be managed by fund managers according to guidelines set 
forth by the FDIC (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
Abuse Prevention 
PPIFs could not buy assets from (1) affiliates of their investors or (2) firms with a stake of 
more than 10% in them; they also were required to “agree to waste, fraud, and abuse 
protections . . . defined by [the Treasury] and the FDIC” (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
Servicing 
Loans would continue to be serviced by the banks that sold them (Legacy Loans Program 
Terms). 
Outcomes 
The announcement of PPIP on March 23, 2009, was received favorably at the time by the 
market; the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average both had gains of 7% that day. 
However, the Legacy Loans Program—as initially drawn up—was never implemented. 
Several reasons seem to have contributed to this outcome. Above all, developing a program 
with features as such (e.g., public-private partnership, auction process) appears to have been 
a difficult task for the FDIC, and the market showed a “reluctance to participate” in a program 
that it consequently viewed as unlikely to succeed (among other reasons) (Polk and 
Wardwell 2009). This difficulty was likely compounded by the fact that even before 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 Put another way, banks selling assets were compensated in cash (equity) and debt notes that were guaranteed 
by the FDIC. The banks could either hold on to these notes or attempt to sell them in the market. 
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attempting to roll out the program, the FDIC had reservations about it (Bair 2013). For more 
information on the response to the program, see the Evaluation section. 
The FDIC did, however, conduct a test run of the program during summer 2009 involving the 
sale of receivership loans to Residential Credit Solutions (RCS), a company that was active in 
the mortgage market. Per the arrangement, RCS purchased a 50% stake in a pool of 
residential mortgage loans with a face value of $1.3 billion for $64 million, leaving the FDIC 
with 50% ownership. It also issued $728 million in FDIC-guaranteed debt directly to the 
FDIC because—through receivership—the FDIC was the owner of these loans. Although 
there has been little analysis of this transaction, it appears to have been successful, given that 
the FDIC has used a similar approach to sell receivership loans on other occasions (Bair 
2013).  
II. Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. The FDIC and Treasury sought to facilitate private investment in troubled 
mortgage loans through a public-private partnership.  
In early 2009, huge markdowns on mortgage-related assets continued to afflict the banks in 
possession of them, consuming their capital and inhibiting their ability to make new loans 
(PPIP White Paper 2009). That March, in recognition of the risks associated with these 
assets, the Treasury established the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) with two 
primary goals in mind. The obvious aim was to create new demand for troubled mortgage 
assets, thus enabling financial institutions to sell them. At the same time, the Treasury 
wanted a considerable portion of the new demand to be from private investors. In order to 
achieve this, it sought to form investment partnerships with them. 
While the government could have purchased these assets on its own, it concluded that 
incorporating the private sector into its approach had three clear advantages: It would (1) 
“[leverage] the impact of each taxpayer dollar,” enabling for the purchase of more assets 
using less TARP funding; (2) reduce government exposure to risk, as the private sector 
would help to shoulder losses on investments; and (3) “provide a mechanism for valuing the 
assets,” helping the government to avoid paying the wrong price for them, which would have 
further distorted the dysfunctional market it sought to fix (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009; Elliott 
2009; Polk and Wardwell 2009).  
2. Treasury funding for PPIP was authorized under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP); the FDIC sought to participate through its systemic risk 
exception.  
Created by Congress in October 2008 with the enactment of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA), the Troubled Asset Relief Program enabled the Treasury “to 
purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability 
to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial system” (Public Law 110—343). 
The law defined troubled assets as: 
(A) residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other 
instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was 
originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary 
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determines promotes financial market stability; and (B) any other financial 
instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is 
necessary to promote financial market stability, but only upon transmittal of such 
determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees of Congress. 
Legacy loans and securities that were eligible for purchase through PPIP largely conformed 
to the description in definition (A). However, given the existence of definition (B), the 
Treasury Secretary also had the authority to decide if other assets needed to be purchased 
and what characteristics to apply to them. 
Meanwhile, the FDIC sought to participate in the program by citing the systemic risk 
exception created by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. 
It is unclear, however, if it ever received the authority to do so (GAO 2011).  
3. The FDIC was responsible for most of the program’s elements, while the Treasury 
provided TARP funding for asset purchases. 
The FDIC was responsible for most of the program’s elements. Its primary duties were to (1) 
“provide oversight for the formation, funding, and operation of [all] PPIFs,” which included 
vetting and approving private sector investors before they could participate;5 (2) appoint 
and work with a “third-party valuation firm” to assess the quality of loan portfolios that 
banks wanted to sell, and to specify a leverage limit for the purchase of them; and (3) hold 
auctions (presumably with the help of third-party contractors), which not only required it to 
coordinate bids but also “preparation of required marketing materials” (i.e., making 
information on auction items—loans—available to PPIFs that were interested in purchasing 
them). The Treasury’s role was that of a funder; it agreed to provide exactly half of each 
PPIF’s equity base.6 The Special Inspector General for TARP and Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) were ready to assist in a supervisory role (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
4. Favorable financing terms were intended to induce private sector investment in 
troubled mortgage loans. 
Because the private market was hesitant to invest in troubled mortgage loans, the 
government needed to provide an incentive for it to do so as part of the Legacy Loans 
Program. As a result, the Treasury agreed to take a 50% stake (or less if investors so desired) 
in assets they purchased, and the FDIC promised to guarantee the nonrecourse debt they 
issued to fund these investments. In so doing, the program effectively reduced the risk borne 
by these investors while amplifying any returns they generated—decreasing the amount of 
capital they would have to gamble on these assets while assuring they had access to 
affordable debt to purchase them (Polk and Wardwell 2009). 
At the same time, the provision of cheap financing was also supposed to increase investor 
tolerance for paying higher prices for these assets (Polk and Wardwell 2009). In this way, 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 The FDIC said that it would “pre-screen” private investors but did not say what specifically it would look for.  
6 The FDIC noted that it would permit PPIFs to accept less equity from the Treasury but did not clarify terms 
that would apply to such a decision. 
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the program would help to convince holders of these assets to choose to now sell them (Polk 
and Wardwell 2009). 
5. FDIC-supervised auctions were intended to recreate a functional marketplace for 
legacy loans.  
The illiquidity of legacy loans in large part was due to the inability of buyers and sellers to 
settle on the price of them amid the ongoing housing correction and credit crisis (Elliott 
2009). By holding auctions for these loans, the FDIC intended to manufacture a market for 
them, helping to “provide a . . . mechanism for valuing [them]” (PPIP Fact Sheet 2009).  
6. Any FDIC-insured bank or savings associations could sell assets to PPIFs.  
For the purpose of the program, these institutions were defined as any “bank or savings 
association organized under the laws of the United States or any State of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the United States, Puerto Rico, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands” (Legacy Loan 
Program Terms).   
7. Few restrictions were placed on who could invest in PPIFs.  
The FDIC and Treasury anticipated that a wide range of investors would want to invest in 
PPIFs—including “financial institutions, individuals, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
publicly managed investment funds and pension funds”—and did not explicitly prohibit 
participation by anyone except for some foreign firms (Legacy Loans Program Terms; 
Financial Crisis Manual). 
8. Eligible institutions could sell mortgage loans secured by real estate located in the 
United States, subject to the approval of such loans by its regulators.   
This was the only explicit asset eligibility guideline issued by the FDIC. Aside from this, banks 
were instructed to “work with their primary bank regulators . . . to identify and sell assets 
with a view to restoring maximum confidence for depositors, creditors, investors, and other 
counterparties”—suggesting that eligibility determinations would be made in consideration 
of the circumstances faced by individual banks (Legacy Loans Program Terms). 
9. The Treasury originally stated the goal of committing up to $100 billion for PPIP’s 
implementation, while the FDIC gave no limit for its participation.  
In announcing PPIP, the Treasury stated the goal of committing up to $100 billion for its 
implementation, with the hope that—once the program incorporated private capital—it 
would be able to provide for the purchase of up to $500 billion in troubled mortgage assets. 
Although the FDIC’s commitment fell in line with this expectation, the agency gave no 
definitive indication of the amount of debt it was willing to guarantee. 
10.  No specific timeline was set for the program. 
No guidance was given as to how many auctions the FDIC would hold and over what time 
frame nor as to how long the PPIFs would have to manage any purchased assets. 
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11.  PPIP was just one of several programs introduced as part of the Financial Stability 
Plan to increase the accessibility and lower the cost of credit.  
In February 2009, the Obama Treasury announced its Financial Stability Plan. Even though 
a wide array of financial stability efforts were already underway, the Obama Treasury saw 
the need for a second wave of crisis-fighting programs—ones specifically designed to “attack 
the credit crisis on all fronts” (Financial Stability Plan). The plan involved the participation 
of several government agencies and—in addition to PPIP—included proposals that 
ultimately became the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), Capital Assistance 
Program (CAP), expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), Small 
Business Administration Section 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, and foreclosure 
prevention programs, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and 
Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP).  
III. Evaluation  
Although the market originally responded favorably to the Legacy Loans Program, it quickly 
became the subject of criticism by media and scholars. Economist and New York Times 
columnist Paul Krugman, for example, thought that the design of the program was inherently 
flawed; while the program offered a clear advantage to private investors, he believed that 
banks selling these assets would see a minimal increase in the price being offered for them. 
In his opinion, this misalignment of incentives for buyers and sellers would produce a 
stalemate between them, rendering the program largely ineffective (Krugman 2009a; 
Krugman 2009b). 
The program was also the subject of scorn by some in the media and scholarly community 
who believed that it created a large moral hazard, promising too many benefits for private 
investors without forcing them to shoulder enough of the risk. New York Times columnist 
Andrew Ross Sorkin likened the opportunity to “risk-free investing,” suggesting that without 
any recourse, private investors would be inclined to bid too much for assets, exposing the 
FDIC to potentially large losses (Sorkin 2009). Jeffrey Sachs, an economist, argued that banks 
would conspire to enrich themselves through the program. In his view, banks would use the 
program to synthetically raise the price of their own troubled assets, and by selling them to 
PPIFs, would be able to transfer most of the losses onto the government (Sachs 2009). 
Former government officials, however, have insisted that most of these concerns were 
unfounded. Former FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair, for instance, rebuked Sorkin’s suggestion 
that the FDIC would ultimately bear the risk for poor investment performance, pointing out 
that any losses borne by the FDIC would be paid for by banking industry assessments (Bair 
2013). Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner likewise argues that the program “was 
not nearly as generous to Wall Street as everyone thought”; in his view, critics were 
downplaying the importance of the private sector having to commit its own capital and 
ignoring the fact that “financial institutions with troubled assets [were] under no obligation 
to sell” them (Geithner 2014).   
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